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Abstract
This paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs
to the n−player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium
configurations, we show for n > 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation - as in
the duopoly model - nor minimize differentiation - as in the multi-firm game with
linear transport cost. Subgame perfect equilibria for games with up to nine players
are characterized by a U-shaped price structure and interior corner firm locations.
Results are driven by an asymmetry between firms. Interior firms are weaker
competitors than their rivals at the corners. Increasing the number of firms shifts
even more power to the corner firms. As a result, there is too much differentia-
tion from the social perspective if n ≤ 3, while adding firms leads to a level of
differentiation in equilibrium below the social optimum.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72, D43, L13, R32
Key words : spatial competition, multi-player games, interval model
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1 Introduction
The literature on Horizontal Product Differentiation focuses on the extent to which
competing firms should give their products a similar design interpreted as a loca-
tion in the space of product characteristics. For the two-stage model where firms
choose locations in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, Hotelling
(1929) acclaimed the principle of minimum differentiation. According to this prin-
ciple, firms approach each other as closely as possible and share the market equally.
D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) corrected him by showing that in his
model neither this strategy nor any other location choices were subgame perfect since
they fail to imply an equilibrium in prices for each subgame. By altering the utility
function from a linear to a quadratic form, resulting in a tougher second stage price
competition, the principle of maximum differentiation could be established where
firms maximize the distance to the opposite player.1
However, maximum differentiation is not as robust as some researchers initially
may have believed (see, for example, Neven, 1985). Relaxing certain assumptions
shifts the balance away from the centrifugal towards the centripetal forces within
the model, destroying possibly the equilibrium of maximum differentiation. Several
parameters have been analyzed which give rise to differentiation equilibria below
the maximum level.2 In this paper, we identify another source strengthening the
1Note that the quadratic term in the utility function measures a loss of utility.
2For example, Economides (1986) considers different utility functions. Bo¨ckem (1994), Hin-
loopen and van Marrewijk (1999), and Wang and Yang (1999) generalize the model on the demand
side. Neven (1986) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) consider more general distributions of the
3
centripetal forces, the number of firms.
Previous research has concentrated on duopoly markets. The question of how
the number of firms affects the equilibrium outcome was widely ignored. Exceptions
comprise Salop (1979), Novshek (1980), and Economides (1989, 1993). Linear utility
models with multiple firms located on a circumference were analyzed by Salop (1979)
and Economides (1989). Salop has shown that in contrast to its unit interval duopoly
counterpart, price equilibria exist in the subgame characterized by an equidistance
of succeeding firms. Nevertheless, a perfect equilibrium could not be found for
every subgame. Economides (1993) elaborated on the similar n-firms interval model
with linear utility. In contrast to the circular model it supports a noncooperative
equilibrium in every price subgame, but fails to imply an equilibrium for the stage
of the location choices. Within the class of multi-firm models with a quadratic
utility function, only the circular model was analyzed. Economides (1989) proved
the existence of a price equilibrium for each pattern of locations, and further, the
existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium with equidistantly located firms.
Those studies revealed that the number of firms seems to have an impact on
stability of the short run price game. However, no further effects regarding the
location choices could be identified. On the circular domain, symmetry of all firms
leads to symmetry of equilibria, given an equilibrium exists at all. Changing the
consumers. Balvers and Szerb (1996) study the impact of demand uncertainty. Mai and Peng
(1999) focus on the information exchange through communication and Fujita and Thisse (1986)
investigate on endogenous household locations. Below maximimum differentiation equilibria even
appear in the model considered by D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) if one permits
mixed strategy Nash equilibria (Bester et al., 1996).
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number of firms cannot qualitatively change equilibrium outcomes, or the degree of
differentiation in the different market segments. Further, no locational equilibrium
exists for the interval model with linear disutility as described by Economides (1993).
Elaborating on the interval model with quadratic disutility may lead to new insights
on the relation between the number of players and the degree of differentiation.
Finally, in contrast to circular models, an analysis of the linear market may prove
useful because the linear space or product characteristics may be of more empirical
relevance.
Essentially, in Hotelling games differentiation is driven by a trade-off between the
short-run and the long-run effects of relocation. In the short-run, firms may attract
new customers by moving towards a competitor’s position. The strategic effect is
a lower price for both, the aggressor and the stationary firm because of increased
competition. Which of both effects dominates depends on the model setup. In the
duopoly game with a quadratic utility function, firms locate at the interval borders.
One may expect a similar behavior when the number of firms increases. One of the
main results of the paper is that in multi-player games, maximum differentiation
is not an equilibrium. Introducing interior firms creates asymmetry in the game
regarding the willingness of firms to cut prices as a response to marginal relocations
by their neighbors. This holds because a price cut by an interior firm would not only
affect the aggressive rival but the other neighbor too (in contrast to price cuts by
corner firms). An interior firm would provoke a response from the neighbor on the
opposite side, making it a weaker competitor. Economides’ (1993) analysis of the
corresponding game with linear disutility shows that the weakness of interior firms
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leads to the so-called ”strong principle of minimum differentiation”. We show, that
quadratic disutility prevents firms from choosing the same location in equilibrium.
Hence, neither maximum nor minimum differentiation can ever be an equilibrium.
If equilibria exist, they are characterized by intermediate levels of differentiation.
We analytically establish locational equilibria for the three-firms case and nu-
merically for game with up to nine players. They are characterized by locations
symmetrically distributed around the market center, where corner firms move con-
siderably towards the center firm(s) and prices are U-shaped.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the model is described. In
Section 3 we demonstrate that a price equilibrium exists for all locational patterns.
General analyses of equilibrium locations and explicit perfect equilibria for games
with up to nine players follow in Section 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes
the paper. Some of the proofs are contained in Appendix.
2 The model
We examine a generalized Hotelling-game with quadratic utility of customers. While
d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) consider a duopoly, we allow for an
arbitrary (but fixed) number of firms. The game proceeds in two stages. In the
first stage n firms choose locations x¯ = (x1, x2, ..., xn) on the unit interval [0, 1].
At the second stage, prices p¯ = (p1, p2, ..., pn) are simultaneously fixed. The firms
produce a homogeneous product and sell one unit to each consumer. Consumers are
equally distributed over the interval. Firms use the same constant returns to scale
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production technology. Marginal costs are normalized to zero.
Since products are homogeneous only transport costs matter for the decision from
which firm to buy. Consumers are endowed with utility uw(xj, pj) = k−pj−(xj−w)2,
where xj represents the location of firm j.
Consumer utility uw has a peak where the consumer’s location w and the firm’s
location coincide. The term −(xj−w)2 can be interpreted as the quadratic disutility
which consumers incur through the distance of transport. k > 0 is the reservation
price. Only if k exceeds the sum of price and transport costs does the consumer
buy.
We are looking for perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies and assume the
coordination problem away. Thus, firms are exogenously assigned numbers which
represent their position in the spatial order. We neglect them not only in view of the
analytical challenges they introduce but also because mixed strategies are not played
by people in complex situations (Rapoport and Amaldoss, 2000). Nevertheless,
ignoring the coordination problem in the multi-firm setting can be regarded as a
shortcoming of the model since no plausible explanations exist why and how such a
formation could appear, in particular if the number of firms is large.
3 Price equilibrium
In order to solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium, we first consider the last stage
of the game. At this stage, locations are already chosen and prices are to be posted
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. To establish results on the existence and
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uniqueness of the price equilibrium, we start by examining the demand of the firms.
The purchasing decision of a consumer is determined by its position, the reser-
vation price, the position of the firms and the prices they charge. In the duopoly
case when the reservation price constraint is binding, i.e., if uw of some individuals
located between the shops becomes negative for the price-location combination of
both firms, these customers will not buy any products. Then firms become local
monopolists. Let us consider the case where the reservation price is sufficiently high
such that every consumer buys a unit of the product. Assuming further that each
firm chooses a different location, the duopoly demand can easily be calculated by
finding the consumer who is indifferent between buying from the left and from the
right firm, i.e. where uw(x1, p1) = uw(x2, p2). This individual divides the set of
consumers into two convex subsets where the left subset will be supplied by the left
firm and vice versa. In the multi-firm case, demand for an inside firm j (1 < j < n)
is not necessarily the set between the marginal consumers with respect to firm j− 1
and j +1. This holds because the direct neighbors may attract no demand at all by
charging prohibitively high relative prices. In this case, firm j competes with two
of the more distant firms. However, this could never be an equilibrium because a
firm with no demand would be better off lowering its price until it attracts some
customers.
Assuming each firm has a positive market share, demand can be expressed as:
D1,0(p¯|x¯) = p2−p12(x2−x1) + x1+x22 ,
Dj,0 (p¯|x¯) = pj+1−pj2(xj+1−xj) −
pj−pj−1
2(xj−xj−1) +
xj+1−xj−1
2
, if 1 < j < n,
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Dn,0 (p¯|x¯) = 1− pn−pn−12(xn−xn−1) −
xn+xn−1
2
,
Obviously, demand Dj,0 is linear in price pj.
3 Starting from a price pprohibj at
which the marginal consumer is indifferent between buying from firms j − 1, j, and
j+1, by successively decreasing its price an inside firm j will reach a value p′j at which
it drives one of the neighbors out of business and starts to compete with the next
firm. Then the above relationship does not hold anymore. If for example the whole
demand of firm j + 1 would have been withdrawn by firm j, i.e. for the marginal
consumer with uw(pj+2, xj+2) = uw (pj, xj) inequality uw (pj, xj) > uw (pj+1, xj+1)
holds, the corresponding demand relationship would be:
Dj,1 (p¯|x¯) = pj+2−pj2(xj+2−xj) −
pj−pj−1
2(xj−xj−1) +
xj+1−xj−1
2
, if 1 < j < n.
This subsequent piece of the demand curve is linear too but less steep. Decreasing
price pj further leads to the undercutting of more and more competitors until the
firm has attracted all customers or pj = 0. Figure 1 shows the resulting demand
curve. Undercutting of neighbors leads to kinks in this curve at prices p′j, p
′′
j , and p
′′′
j
where the demand of the respective neighbors is withdrawn. The resulting demand
function of firm j corresponds to the lower envelope of all Dj,k (k = 0, .., n − 1).
Obviously, it is concave. Similarly, one obtains a concave demand curve for the
corner firms. Hence, we have established:
Proposition 1 The demand function Dj is concave with respect to the firm’s price
3The second subscript denotes the number of neighbors of firm j whose (potential) demand
is totally withdrawn by firm j. In this case, even customers having the same location as those
neighbor firms would rather buy from firm j.
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pj.
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem can be applied to prove the existence of a non-
cooperative price equilibrium. Friedman (1977) shows that if the number of players
is finite, the strategy set of the ith player is a compact convex subset of Rn and if
the profit function is quasi-concave with respect to the own price, the fixed point
theorem holds. Moreover, uniqueness of this equilibrium can be shown. Economides’
(1989) proof for the circular model is easily extended to the interval model.4
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Note that up to this point configurations were neglected where some firms choose
the same location. If this is the case then these firms would price their products at
marginal cost because it would always pay to undercut the rival’s price to attract
some demand given prices are higher than marginal costs. This logic follows the
well known Bertrand result. Together with the above considerations this leads to
Proposition 2 For every given pattern of locations there exists a unique equilibrium
of the price setting stage.
Given each firm has a positive market share maximizing the profit function
Πj(p¯|x¯) = pjDj,0(p¯|x¯) with respect to pj leads to the following price reaction func-
tions:
4Showing that ∂
2Πj
∂p2j
+
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣ ∂2Πj∂pj∂pi ∣∣∣ < 0 for all j is sufficient to conclude that best replies
are contractions and thus, that the equilibrium is unique. For interior firms, Economides’ (1989)
results are identical to ours. For the left corner firm (and correspondingly for the right corner
firm), we find that ∂
2Π1
∂p21
+
∑
i6=1
∣∣∣ ∂2Π1∂p1∂pi ∣∣∣ = − 12(x2−x2) < 0.
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p∗1(p¯|x¯) = [p2 + (x1 + x2)(x2 − x1)] /2,
p∗j (p¯|x¯) = pj+1(xj−xj−1)2(xj+1−xj−1) +
pj−1(xj+1−xj)
2(xj+1−xj−1) +
(xj+1−xj)(xj−xj−1)
2
, if 1 < j < n,
p∗n (p¯|x¯) = [pn−1 + (2− xn−1 − xn)(xn − xn−1)] /2.
It is easy to verify that the system of prices is identified.
4 No maximum, no minimum differentiation
In the following two sections, we are concerned about the characterization of lo-
cational equilibria, given the price reaction functions of the last stage. We first
attempt to characterize equilibria for games with any number of players. Because
of analytical difficulties, a full characterization of location equilibria could not be
achieved.5 In this section, we show that under very general conditions, firms do nei-
ther maximize differentiation nor do they minimize differentiation. The subsequent
section provides locations and prices for games with less than ten players.
For the corner firms, one may expect maximum differentiation in equilibrium,
i.e. locations at the interval boundaries. This pattern is suggested by the corre-
sponding duopoly model. We show that given any number of players larger than
two, maximum differentiation in this sense would never prevail in equilibrium.
In contrast, the multi-firm model with linear disutility implies firms having al-
5Because of asymmetry between firms, the interval model with quadratic disutility is analytically
less tractable than the other variants of the model examined by Economides (1989, 1993). First,
in contrast to the circular models, it matters how many neighbors of a firm are located on each of
its sides. Second, in contrast to the linear disutility models, it matters how large are the distances
between all of the firms.
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ways an incentive to marginally relocate towards the central firm(s). Economides
(1993) calls this behavior the ”strong principle of minimum differentiation”. We
show that quadratic disutility destroys the possibility for minimum differentiation
to be an equilibrium strategy.
In order to prove that corner firms do not maximize distance to their direct
neighbors, we first show that corner firms being located at the interval boundaries
possess incentives to move towards the market center, given that locations of the
adjacent rivals are not too close.
Lemma 1 Given any set of locations x with x1 = 0 and x2 ∈
[
x3
2
, x3
]
, firm 1 always
has an incentive to marginally relocate towards firm 2. Correspondingly, given any
set of locations x with xn = 1 and xn−1 ∈
[
xn−2,
1+xn−2
2
,
]
, firm n always has an
incentive to marginally relocate towards firm n− 1.
The proof is in the appendix. Note that under the given condition, firms 3 to
n− 2 could not prevent corner firms from profitably decreasing differentiation.
Lemma 2 Given any set of locations x with x1 = 0 and x2 =
x3
2
, firm 2 never has
an incentive to marginally relocate towards firm 1. Correspondingly, firm n−1 never
has an incentive to marginally relocate towards firm n if xn = 1 and xn−1 =
1+xn−2
2
.
In lemma 2, which is proven in the appendix, we show that the corner firms’
neighbors have optimal locations closer to firm 3 (n − 2) than to the respective
corner firm, given x1 = 0 (xn = 1). From lemma 1 and lemma 2, we can derive the
following proposition.
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Proposition 3 Assuming that a locational equilibrium exists for the quadratic disu-
tility Hotelling game with n > 2 players choosing locations x∗ = (x∗1, .., x
∗
n) on the
unit interval, this equilibrium would never entail maximum differentiation for the
corner firms, i.e. x∗1 > 0 and x
∗
n < 1.
Lemma 1 and 2 imply something more general than actually stated in proposi-
tion 3. Even including a large set of rivals’ off-the-equilibrium locations, maximum
differentiation by corner firms is never a best response, given the next neighbor is
not too closely located.
If interior players are present corner firms do would not maximize differentiation
to their adjacent rivals. Interior firms are at a disadvantage vis-a`-vis the corner
firms because their prices are bound to react much softer to a marginal relocation by
their neighbors. Corner firms can compete tougher in prices, and thus in locations,
because price changes are confined exclusively on the ”aggressor”, while an interior
player would also initiate responses by neighbors on the other side.
One might wonder if softer price competition of interior firms ultimately leads to
minimum differentiation. Minimum differentiation would prevail if firms have in ev-
ery spatial configuration a tendency to relocate marginally towards the central firms,
such as in the linear disutility variant of this model (Economides, 1993). However,
despite the fact that interior firms are weaker competitors than their neighbors at
the interval boundaries, it is still not optimal for any firm to approach a direct neigh-
bor too closely. We show that the equilibria do no collapse as in the corresponding
game with linear disutility.
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Lemma 3 Given any set of locations x, firm i (i = 2, .., n) has an incentive to
marginally relocate away from firm i − 1 if (xi − xi−1) becomes sufficiently small.
Correspondingly, given any set of locations x, firm i (i = 1, .., n−1) has an incentive
to marginally relocate away from firm i+1 if (xi+1 − xi) becomes sufficiently small.
From lemma 3, we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assuming that a locational equilibrium exists for the quadratic disu-
tility Hotelling game with n > 2 players choosing locations x∗ = (x∗1, .., x
∗
n) on the
unit interval, this equilibrium would not entail minimum differentiation for any of
the firms, i.e. x∗i−1 < x
∗
i for all i ≤ n.
The proof is in the appendix.
We have shown that some prominent locational structures can be excluded from
the set of potential equilibrium strategies. Unfortunately, we still do not know
which, if any, equilibria appear in the case of more than two players. This question
is addressed in the following section.
5 Locational equilibria for three to nine players
In order to obtain explicit locational equilibrium solutions x¯∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n) for
the multi-firm case, explicit price reaction functions of the last stage of the game
are required. As derived in Section 3, the price of a firm depends on its location, the
location of its direct neighbors, and the prices they charge. Hence, prices depend
indirectly on all other prices and ultimately, locations. Transforming this system of
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implicit price functions into a system of functions with only locations on the right
hand side is a difficult task. Without imposing any constraints, the equation system
could not be solved when the number of firms is large. The solution of the three-
firms game can be obtained analytically. For games with more than three players,
we applied numerical methods to find equilibria.6
The solutions are shown in Figure 2. As we expect from the results of the previous
section, the corner firms move considerably towards the central firms. In the three-
firms case, the distance to the interval boundary is 1
8
. Adding firms to the market
leads corner firms to locate closer to the interval end points in absolute terms. Thus,
it seems that competition for the corner firms becomes fiercer as they are pushed
towards the borders. However, relating the absolute distance of the corner firm to
its respective interval boundary to the average distance between neighbors shows a
reverse picture. The relative position of the corner firms is strengthened the more
players are in the game. In the four-player case this ratio is about one half as
opposed to one third in the three firms case. Games with five to nine players lead
to only weakly increasing ratios of about 0.53. Thus apparently the pressure for
the corner firms to differentiate decreases in relative terms with the number of firms
since price competition is softened at the same time.
6Besides verifying that first and second order conditions of the profit functions are fulfilled, pro-
viding that the solution represents a local profit maximum, we excluded an instability of the pattern
with respect to larger steps of relocation by making sure that it would not pay off for any firm
to change the position along the interval limited by its direct neighbors’ locations (leap-frogging).
In particular, it is shown numerically that d
2Πj(p
∗(xj,x∗−j),xj |x∗−j)
dx2j
< 0 for xj ∈
[
x∗j−1, x
∗
j+1
]
, if
1 < j < n, and for x1 ∈ [0, x∗2] and xn ∈
[
x∗n−1, 1
]
, otherwise.
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
How distant is the social optimum away from the corresponding equilibrium?
Would there be identical prices, the socially optimal outcome would require that
succeeding firms have equal distance and corner firms locate one half of this stretch
away from the interval boundaries. This configuration would minimize transport
costs. However, equilibrium prices are U-shaped.7 Taking the distorting price effect
into account, we find too much differentiation if n = 3 and too less differentiation
for n > 3. The reason is that the degree of price competition is the less intense the
higher is the number of firms. As the relative power of the corner firm increases
with an rising number of firms, the market becomes more squeezed.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 shows that equilibrium profits decrease with the number of firms. This
is due to the increase of price competition induced by additional competitors. More
interestingly, the relative increase of market power enjoyed by the corner firms fol-
lowing an increase of the number of rivals is also reflected in the firms’ profits. In
the three-firm case the equilibrium profit of the center firm considerably exceeds
the corner firms’ profits. In this case, because the center firm is not as weak a
price competitor as were there more interior firms, a higher number of consumers
attracted by the center firm compensates for the lower price. When four players
compete, profits are almost equally distributed while in the oligopoly with five or
7In such an equidistant setting, prices would be U-shaped too. The proof is available from the
author.
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more players central firms earn much less than their corner rivals. Although the
center firm finds itself in an uncomfortable position, there is no higher profitable
market niche to relocate to.8
6 Conclusions
We analyzed the multi-firm unit interval Hotelling model under quadratic transport
costs. Firms choose locations in the first stage and prices in the second stage of
the game. Existence and uniqueness of the short run price game is established. In
contrast to the results for the similar circular model and the duopoly interval model it
has been shown that the principle of maximum differentiation does not hold. Under
very general conditions, including any possible equilibrium configurations, corner
firms would benefit from moving marginally towards their adjacent rivals. Equally
the (strong) principle of minimum differentiation such as established for the similar
multi-firm game with linear transport costs (Economides, 1993) does not hold. Firms
would never choose the same location as a best response to location choices by
their rivals. A fortiori, no equilibrium would entail minimum differentiation. Given
that a perfect equilibrium exists, it corresponds to an in-between differentiation
8It cannot be excluded that this might change as the number of firms grows. Positions between
the boundary and the corner firm or between the corner and its neighbor firm may provide a region
large enough to be more profitable than the center location if the number of firms exceeds nine.
Then subgame perfect equilibria may not be identified by local first and second order conditions
alone which makes the search for them more difficult or even destroys the possibility for a perfect
equilibrium.
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configuration.
Explicit perfect equilibria are calculated for games with up to nine firms. They
are characterized by a U-shaped price structure and corner firms which are located
inside the interval. The distance between the corner firms and their direct neigh-
bors is larger than the distances between the interior firms. This follows from an
asymmetry in price competition. Introducing interior firms creates asymmetry in
the game regarding the willingness of firms to cut prices as a response to marginal
relocations by their neighbors. A price cut by an interior firm would not only affect
the aggressive rival but the remaining firms too (in contrast to price cuts by corner
firms). This externality makes an interior firm a weaker competitor. The resulting
increase of ”relative” market power together with an increase of overall competition
leads to lower absolute but higher relative profits of the corner firms. Further, the
competitive advantage of the corner firms is partially transferred to their neighbors
which is reflected in higher prices of firms close to the market boundaries.
Viewed from the welfare perspective, we find too much differentiation if n ≤ 3.
Increasing the number shifts relatively more power to the corner firms which use
this power to squeeze their inside rivals. Interior firms become softer rivals. This
leads to a level of differentiation below the social optimum for n > 3.
How does the number of firms influence the equilibrium outcome of Hotelling
games? Comparing our results with the studies by Salop (1979) and Economides
(1989, 1993), it seems that increasing the number of firms has three effects. First,
price equilibrium is not endangered. For the quadratic transport costs model, a Nash
equilibrium exists for the duopoly as well as for the oligopoly variant. Assuming
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linear transport costs, price equilibria exist for the multi-firm case in symmetric
configurations, while it does not exist in the duopoly case. Second, introducing a
market boundary leads to asymmetry between firms with interior firms becoming
weaker price competitors. For multi-firm interval models under linear transport
costs, the existence of interior firms leads to minimum differentiation. In this paper,
we show that it destroys maximum differentiation as an equilibrium under quadratic
transport costs. Third, given a market boundary, corner firms enjoy greater market
power than their inside competitors. This is reflected in a U-shaped price structure
in linear market models, and in larger than average distances between corner firms
and their direct neighbors in the particular quadratic disutility model.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Mathematically, we have to show that dΠ1(x)
dx1
> 0 for any
x = (x1, .., xn) with x1 = 0 and x2 =
x3(1+α)
2
, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Using the implicit price functions for firm 1 and 2 as derived in Section 3, and
making use of lemma 4 for the representation of p3, i.e. p3 = c3(x2, .., xn)p2 +
d3(x2, .., xn) we obtain
dΠ1(x)
dx1
=
p1
x23(20+46α−2α3+2(1+α)3c23−(1+α)(17+3α(4+α)))c3+4d3(1+7α−2(1+α)c3)
2(1+α)x23(7+α−2(1+α)c3)2 > 0 with c3 ≤
1
2
,
and d3 ≥ 0. The proof for firm n works analogously.
Proof of Lemma 2. Again, because of symmetric properties of the problems,
we concentrate on the case of the left firm . We have to show that dΠ2(x)
dx2
≥ 0 for
any x = (x1, .., xn) with x1 = 0 and x2 =
x3
2
. Using implicit price functions for p1,
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p2 and p3 as derived in Section 3 and lemma 4 for the representation of p4, with p4 =
c4(x3, .., xn)p3+d4(x3, .., xn) we obtain
dΠ2(x)
dx2
= p2
4(2−c4)(24(d4+(x4−x3)2)+24x3(x4−x3)+(2−c4)x23)
(24(x4−x3)+7(2−c4)x3)2 .
With 0 ≤ d4 ≤ 12 and c4 ≥ 0, it is easy to see that dΠ2(x)dx2 > 0. For the three-firms
case, dΠ2(x)
dx2
= 0 can be easily derived.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that lemma 3 holds for the corner firms.
Given the implicit price functions of firm 1 and 2 such as presented in Section 3 and
using lemma 4 for the representation of p3 similarly as in lemma 1 and lemma 2, we
show for any x = (x1, .., xn) with x1 = x2 − ε, that dΠ1(x)dx1 < 0 and
dΠ2(x)
dx2
> 0 if ε
becomes sufficiently small. We obtain
dΠ1(x)
dx1
= p1
2(ε−2c3ε+3(x3−x1))2
(
−3(x3−x1)(d3+(x3−x1)(x3+3x1))
ε
+ z11 + εz12 + ε
2z13
)
and
dΠ2(x)
dx2
= p2
2(ε−2c3ε+3(x3−x1))2(ε+x1−x3)2
(
6(x3−x1)3(d3+x3(x3−x1))+z21ε+z22ε2+z23ε3+z24ε4+z25ε5
ε
)
,
with z being terms which do not depend on ε.
Similarly, we have to show that, given any location configuration, an interior firm
i would move away from a direct neighbor if the distance between them becomes too
small. It is sufficient to show that this holds between a firm and one of its neighbors.
We use lemma 4 to express prices pi+1 = ci+1(x1, .., xi)pi+ di+1(x1, .., xi) and pi−1 =
ai−1(xi, .., xn)pi + bi−1(xi, .., xn). Calculating the first order profit condition for firm
i with xi−1 = xi − ε, we obtain
dΠi(x)
dx1
= A
(
(xi−xi−1)3(2−ai−1)
(
(xi−xi−1)2+ bi−1ε (xi−xi−1)+di+1
)
+z1ε+z2ε2+z3ε3+z4ε4
ε
)
,
with A = pi
2(xi−xi−1)2(2(xi−xi−1+ε)−ai−1(xi−xi−1)−εci+1)2 and z being terms which do
not depend on ε. Thus, since obviously dΠi(x)
dx1
> 0 for sufficient close locations of
firm i − 1 and firm i, there would be an incentive for firm i to marginally move
away. With the same logic, we can prove that firm i− 1 would have an incentive to
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marginally move away from firm i, provided locations are sufficiently close.
Lemma 4 The price of firm i < n can be expressed as pi = ai(x1, .., xi+1)pi+1 +
bi(x1, .., xi+1), with 0 ≤ ai ≤ 12 and bi ≥ 0. Similarly, the price of firm i > 1 can be
expressed as pi = ci(xi−1,.., xn)pi−1 + di(xi−1,.., xn), with 0 ≤ ci ≤ 12 and di ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Proof is by complete induction. We start with the first
part of lemma 4. It obviously holds for i = n (see implicit price functions in Section
3). If i < n, the implicit price function of firm i is given by
pi = pi−1
(xi+1−xi)
2(xi+1−xi−1) + pi+1
(xi−xi−1)
2(xi+1−xi−1) +
(xi+1−xi)(xi−xi−1)
2
.
Given that pi−1 = ai−1pi + bi−1 with ai−1 ≤ 12 and bi−1 ≥ 0, we can write pi as
pi = pi+1
(xi−xi−1)
2(xi+1−xi−1)−ai−1(xi+1−xi) +
(xi+1−xi)((xi+1−xi−1)(xi−xi−1)+bi−1)
2(xi+1−xi−1)−ai−1(xi+1−xi) .
With xi−1 ≤ xi ≤ xi+1, it is easy to see that 0 ≤ ai = (xi−xi−1)2(xi+1−xi−1)−ai−1(xi+1−xi) ≤ 12
and
bi =
(xi+1−xi)((xi+1−xi−1)(xi−xi−1)+bi−1)
2(xi+1−xi−1)−ai−1(xi+1−xi) ≥ 0. The second part of lemma 4 holds
because of symmetry of the problems.
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firms Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 Firm 8 Firm 9
three 0.0550 0.0787 0.0550 - - - - - -
four 0.0209 0.0219 0.0219 0.0209 - - - - -
five 0.0113 0.0105 0.008 0.0105 0.0113 - - - -
six 0.0068 0.0063 0.0043 0.0043 0.0063 0.0068 - - -
seven 0.0044 0.0041 0.0028 0.0025 0.0028 0.0041 0.0044 - -
eight 0.0030 0.0028 0.0024 0.0017 0.0017 0.0024 0.0028 0.0030 -
nine 0.0022 0.0020 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0020 0.0022
Table 1: Equilibrium profits
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